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Abstract 
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disclosed holdings of top-tier managers significantly underperform the underlying fund, 
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1. Introduction 
We investigate the trade-off between measurement accuracy and the leakage of 
commercially sensitive (valuable) information when portfolio holdings data is publically 
reported at varying frequencies and lags. Our study is unique in that we investigate the 
effect of portfolio holdings disclosure in the Australian regulatory environment, where 
formalised mandatory portfolio disclosure is absent, in contrast to the U.S. system. This 
means that funds are able to earn alpha without public scrutiny of their holdings, or the 
fear of being copied market-wide. Interestingly, Alpert, Rekenthaler and Suh (2013) 
document in the Morningstar Global Fund Investor Experience Report covering 24 
countries, 'Australia and New Zealand still do not have regulations in place requiring 
portfolio information.'1 In contrast, other studies on portfolio disclosure have focussed on 
the US market.  The shift by the SEC in 2004 from semi-annual to quarterly reporting 
highlighted a number of issues concerning the relationship between disclosure frequency 
and fund performance/market quality. However no previous study2 has investigated the 
issues associated with switching from no holdings disclosure to some voluntary form of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The lack of portfolio holdings disclosure in Australia has seen the Australian government in recent times seek to introduce 2	  A notable exception is Brown, K. & Gregory-Allen, R. B. 2012. The Potential Effects of Mandatory Portfolio Holdings 
Disclosure in Australia and New Zealand. Working Paper, Massey University. who investigate the effect on performance 
and fund inflows of Australian and New Zealand funds that voluntarily disclose fund holdings in the Morningstar database. 
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disclosure, usually to asset consulting firms. Our study seeks to address this gap in the 
research.3 
A number of arguments have been presented against both mandatory holdings 
disclosure and the implementation of more frequent disclosure regimes. The main concern 
is that third party investors are able to anticipate fund manager trades by looking at their 
recent holdings positions, and position themselves to front-run. Furthermore, freeloading 
fund managers may also be able to exploit the costly research that other funds have done 
through copycat strategies, and potentially undercut these funds on management fees. The 
combination of these behaviors has the potential to both increase transaction costs for 
entities that are required to periodically disclose their holdings, and reduce motivation for 
original research.  Fund managers also typically cite concerns that revealing portfolio 
positions may enable others to reverse engineer their investment processes and strategies, 
thereby revealing the fund managers’ intellectual property (IP). 
Our access to high-granularity inter-day trading data enables us to go beyond the 
implied trades (derived from changes in holdings) that many prior studies have used, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Australia,	  since	  1994,	  has	  operated	  a	  highly	  effective	  continuous	  disclosure	  regime	  for	  listed	  companies	  on	  the	  ASX	  that	  is	  policed	  (now)	  by	  the	  Australian	  Securities	  and	  Investments	  Commission	  (ASIC).	  	  An	  alternative	  disclosure	  regime	  for	  listed	  firms	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (Regulation	  Fair	  Disclosure)	  has	  operated	  since	  2000	  to	  remove	  selective	  private	  information	  from	  benefiting	  some	  in	  the	  market	  over	  others.	  See	  Beekes,	  W.,	  Brown,	  P.	  &	  Zhang,	  Q.	  2014.	  Corporate	  governance	  and	  the	  informativeness	  of	  disclosures	  in	  Australia:	  a	  re-­‐examination.	  
Accounting	  &	  Finance,	  Forthcoming,	  ibid.and	  Chapple,	  L.	  &	  Truong,	  T.	  P.	  Ibid.Continuous	  disclosure	  compliance:	  does	  corporate	  governance	  matter?	  ,	  1-­‐24.	  for	  details	  of	  continuous	  disclosure	  in	  Australia.	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enables us to contribute to this literature by investigating factor-adjusted returns and 
portfolio volatility on a daily level, which has not been previously possible. Our results 
show that hypothetical periodic portfolio disclosure tends to underestimate true excess 
fund performance. However, the measurement error is concentrated in top-quartile 
performing fund managers, with longer inter-reporting intervals tending to result in even 
greater differences. We also show that longer intervals between when holdings are 
disclosed potentially mean that investors may find it more difficult to identify genuinely 
skilled funds, while at the same time not fully realising the level of diversifiable risk they 
are taking on by investing in fund managers with top-tier performance. 
The second part of this study ascertains the extent to which commercially sensitive 
information is leaked through periodic disclosure of holdings by simulating ‘copycat 
funds’ that emulate the reported holdings of a fund on a delayed basis (with delays ranging 
from one (1) month to one (1) year). We find that copycat funds, on average, do not 
perform significantly differently from their underlying funds (with the exception of annual 
reporting with a one month lag, in which case the copycat underperforms). However, 
partitioning the funds into performance quartiles show that copycat funds significantly 
underperform top-quartile funds at lags of six (6) months or shorter, while significantly 
outperforming bottom-quartile funds at lags of three (3) months or longer. 
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents prior 
research on the effects and outcomes of mandatory portfolio disclosure; section 3 
describes the data used in this study; section 4 details the research design and empirical 
results of determining disclosure accuracy and the effectiveness of potential copycat 
strategies; and section 5 concludes. 
2. Background 
Proponents in favor of portfolio holdings disclosure argue that greater availability 
of historical holdings data enables investors to make better-informed decisions about their 
choice of investment managers, which enhances competition, reduces fees, and increases 
the efficiency of the industry as a whole. Indeed, it has been shown that reporting 
frequency is positively related to the accuracy with which fund manager performance may 
be measured (e.g., see Bollen and Busse (2001)), and is an enabling factor for investors to 
predict future performance (e.g., see Elton, Gruber and Blake (2011)).  
Even without full disclosure, earlier studies have shown that powerful inferences 
can be made regarding a fund manager’s investment ability. For example, Wermers, Yao 
and Zhao (2012) use holdings-based analysis of fund portfolios to reveal differences in 
fund managers’ abilities to predict firms’ future earnings from fundamental factors that are 
not subsumed by publicly available quantitative predictors. The impact of the “missing 
data” is also telling. Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2008) demonstrate that the 
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unobserved actions of fund managers (i.e. the interim trading that occurs between 
reporting dates) persistently create value for some managers, while destroying value for 
others. The resulting ‘return gap’ (i.e. the difference between inferred returns from 
periodically disclosed holdings and reported returns) was shown to predict fund 
performance. Puckett and Yan (2011) confirm this result by showing that interim trading 
skill is a persistent measure of investment ability, however they also demonstrate that 
quarterly reported holdings underestimate true excess returns by approximately 0.25% 
annually.  
The primary concern that detractors voice against the public disclosure of fund 
manager holdings is the leakage of commercially sensitive information to competing 
investors. Agarwal, Mullally, Tang and Yang (2013) show that the SEC’s introduction of 
quarterly holdings disclosure (from semi-annual disclosure) in 2004 led to smaller 
abnormal returns in superior funds, particularly for illiquid stocks and those which were 
subject to greater information asymmetry. Parida and Teo (2011) independently confirmed 
this by showing that semi-annually reporting fund managers with high abnormal returns in 
periods prior to 2004 no longer outperformed comparable quarterly reporting funds after 
the introduction of mandatory quarterly reporting. This shift was particularly profound in 
previously superior funds which held illiquid assets. For other market participants, 
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however, the increased frequency in holdings disclosure led to greater liquidity in stocks 
with high fund ownership, and improved market quality (see Agarwal et al. (2013)). 
A number of specific reasons have been cited for a decline in the performance of 
skilled managers in the context of more frequent portfolio disclosure. Wermers (2001) 
discusses the possibility of total shareholder returns from mutual fund investments 
decreasing with more frequent disclosure, due to both the front-running of mutual fund 
trades (e.g. when shifting a position, generating cash during a liquidity call, or for tax-loss 
selling purposes), and free-riding on fund investment strategies. The latter, known as 
‘copycat funds’, have been shown to earn returns that are statistically indistinguishable, 
and possibly higher after fees, compared to original funds, when rebalancing is based on 
semi-annually disclosed fund holdings lagged up to 60 days from the snapshot date (e.g., 
see Frank, Poterba, Shackelford and Shoven (2004)). Furthermore, Verbeek and Wang 
(2013) show that the relative success of copycat funds significantly increased after 2004, 
when the SEC imposed quarterly disclosure regulations on all mutual funds. We build on 
these prior studies by investigating the performance of potential copycat funds across a 
number of different disclosure regimes, which also indirectly tests the time sensitivity of 
fund manager trades. 
A periodic holdings disclosure regime may also lead to adverse agency effects. For 
example, Bhattacharyya and Nanda (2013) demonstrate how an informed fund manager, 
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compensated on the basis of their fund’s NAV, is incentivised to pump their portfolio 
(artificially ramping the price of held stocks prior to the reporting date) despite long-term 
damage to fund performance. Consistent with this view, Hu, McLean, Pontiff and Wang 
(2013) find that institutions do indeed buy stocks in which they already have large 




We use a data set containing daily transactions and monthly holdings from 58 
active Australian equity fund managers, spanning fifteen years from 1 January 1996 to 31 
December 2010 inclusive.4  Previous research using this data set (see Chen, Foster, 
Gallagher and Wermers (2014)) and broader data sets of Australian fund managers (see 
Pinnuck (2003), Fong, Gallagher and Lee (2008)), has shown that fund managers do 
indeed appear to be skilled and highlighted the potential for copycat funds to exploit 
disclosed fund manager holdings. 
The data were compiled through two phases of collection. In the first phase, carried 
out in 2002, fund managers were invited to provide daily transactions, holdings and 
aggregate performance data. These funds were selected in consultation with Mercer 
Investment Consulting, and were asked to provide information on their largest5 pooled 
active6 Australian equity funds that were open to institution investors. This resulted in data 
for 33 fund managers who provided the requested data. The sample is skewed towards 
larger institutions, and is representative of the larger-sized managers available to 
investment. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  More	  recent	  data	  for	  portfolio	  holdings	  were	  not	  available,	  as	  the	  database	  had	  been	  collected	  at	  specific	  points	  through	  to	  only	  2010.	  	  Collecting	  such	  data	  is	  labour	  intensive	  and	  relies	  on	  networks	  and	  providing	  comfort	  that	  the	  information	  will	  be	  held	  confidentially	  and	  used	  appropriately.	  5	  Marked-­‐to-­‐market	  valuation	  of	  assets	  under	  management	  as	  of	  31st	  December	  2001	  6	  >1% target ex-ante tracking error	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The second phase, carried out in 2011, contributed the monthly holdings and daily 
trades of the underlying active managers in two large multi-manager funds. The first 
source comprises 11 underlying funds from a large open-ended fund-of-funds. The second 
source comprises 14 underlying funds from a large industry superannuation fund. In both 
cases, permission to collect fund trades and holdings data was sought from and granted by 
the multi-fund manager with no interaction with the underlying managers.  
While this data set represents a restricted sample of Australian active fund 
managers, we believe it is nevertheless representative of the wider universe. Figure 1 
presents the performance of our sample managers compared to the more comprehensive 
set of managers tracked by the Mercer Performance Analytics (MPA) database. Our data 
set provides a key advantage over most previous studies on fund manager performance 
evaluation: the daily transactions contained in our database allow us to evaluate trading 
performance on an inter-day basis, whereas previous studies (with the notable exception of 
Puckett and Yan (2011)) have been limited to, at best, monthly precision (e.g. Bennett, 
Gallagher, Harman, Warren and Xi (2013)). When evaluating stock trading ability in an 
environment of short-lived information and fleeting profitable opportunities, the 
granularity of data is a critical element (see Kothari and Warner (2001)). 
Table 1, Panel A provides key statistics regarding the composition and trading 
activity in our database. Over the 1996 to 2010 period, our data set had a total of 58 fund 
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managers who executed 96,276 buys and 85,131 sells. This was equivalent to 
approximately AU$59 billion in purchases and AU$57 billion in sales. Panel B presents a 
breakdown of trades by security characteristic. We observe that fund trades are primarily 
in large-cap stocks and stocks with low book-to-market ratios (i.e. growth-oriented 
stocks). Stocks with poor past returns are traded infrequently. 
To complement our daily trade database, we also used daily price level and 
dilutions data from the SIRCA Australian Equities Tick History database, market 
capitalization and dividend data from the Share Price and Price Relative database, 
financial statement data from the Aspect Huntley database, and news announcements from 
SIRCA Core Research Data (CRD). 
4. Method and Discussion 
4.1. Accuracy vs. Alpha Leakage 
In this section we analyse the reliability of reported portfolios in informing the 
returns and volatility of the underlying portfolio. The more frequently portfolio holdings 
are reported, the more accurate inferences regarding its return and volatility structures are 
likely to be (see Bollen and Busse (2001)). However, due to the cost of reporting and 
information leakage constraints, there must be an ideal frequency which facilitates 
accurate performance measurement, while concurrently protecting valuable intellectual 
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property. In the US, this frequency was determined to be every six (6) months prior to 
2004, and every three (3) months subsequently.  
The reported portfolios comprise snapshots of the underlying funds taken at 
varying intervals (monthly, quarterly, semi-annual or annual). The return and risk 
characteristics of the reported portfolios are then computed using a buy-and-hold strategy 
that assumes each snapshot remains static until the next discrete snapshot. Performance is 
measured in terms of raw returns and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), which are 
based on DGTW characteristics-based alpha. The latter benchmarks a stock’s daily return 
against other stocks of similar size, book-to-market ratio and prior return characteristics. 
Unlike regression-based methods, it allows excess performance to be determined cross-
sectionally at high data frequency (see Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997)) for 
further details on the construction and rationalisation of the DGTW alpha benchmark). 
The abnormal return (𝐴𝑅!") of a stock 𝑠 on day 𝑡 is defined as: 
 𝐴𝑅!,! = 𝑟!,! − 𝐷𝐺𝑇𝑊!,! (1) 
  𝑟!" is the dilution-adjusted arithmetic return of 𝑠 on day 𝑡 and 𝐷𝐺𝑇𝑊!" is the return 
earned by the characteristic-based benchmark portfolio associated with 𝑠. We follow 
Pinnuck (2003) in using a 5 x 4 x 3 sort on size, book-to-market ratio and momentum, 
rather than the 5 x 5 x 5 sort used by Daniel et al. (1997), to reflect the fact that there are 
fewer listed stocks on the ASX than on the US market. 
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Over an 𝑛 -day observation period, we use the cumulative abnormal return 
(𝐶𝐴𝑅!,!,!) as our excess performance measure, given by: 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅!,!,! = 1+ 𝑟!,!!! − 1+ 𝐷𝐺𝑇𝑊!,!!!!!!!  
 
(2) 
In the following sections, we look at two indicators of how reliably periodically 
reported portfolios are able to reflect the true performance of underlying funds. 
 
4.1.1. Expected error over long-term measurements  
Puckett and Yan (2011) demonstrate that fund managers in the United States 
generate statistically significant alpha in the intra-quartile period between SEC mandated 
13F reporting dates. We use Australian trades and portfolio holdings data to investigate 
whether a similar trend occurs in Australia, and to what extent short-term trade timing 
ability can be captured by a regime of periodic holdings disclosure. Table 2, Panel A 
compares the actual excess return against that inferred from reported holdings at intervals 
ranging from monthly to yearly. Actual fund returns vary between different reporting 
intervals, since longer reporting periods typically truncate the data towards the end – e.g. if 
a fund is included in the data set for 4 years and 9 months, then the final 3 months of data 
is discarded when measuring semi-annually reported performance, and the final 9 months 
of data is discarded when measuring annually reported performance. 
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Table 2, Panel A suggests that, consistent with Puckett and Yan (2011), periodic 
reporting tends to underestimate true fund performance. The error appears to be most 
statistically significant at shorter reporting intervals (i.e. monthly and quarterly) though 
this can primarily be attributed to the smaller sample size when testing longer reporting 
periods. The small magnitude of mean measurement errors, however, hides the underlying 
variation between top-quartile performing managers and those in lower bands. Table 2 
(Panel B) partitions the funds into quartiles by performance ranking based on mean 
DGTW alpha, which can only be measured with holdings level data. The results show that 
periodic holdings disclosure consistently underestimates true alpha for top-performing 
funds, whereas no such consistency is observed in lower bands. In addition, longer 
intervals between reporting tend to exacerbate the difference between a top-quartile 
manager’s performance based on their reported portfolio and their true performance. 
Estimation errors in the best performing funds are a greater concern than in other funds, 
since prospective investors seek funds exhibiting evidence of consistent positive skill. 
Superior funds may be incentivised to disclose holdings more frequently than the 
minimum requirement, barring concerns in relation to possible copycatting (which is 
addressed in the next section).  
While returns data is readily available to institutional investors for a wide range of 
managed funds (e.g. through industry surveys), data on the volatility of these returns are 
14 	  
usually less accessible. Regularly disclosed portfolio holdings enable prospective investors 
to gauge the historical volatility and idiosyncratic risk of each fund through analysis of the 
reporting positions. Table 3, Panel A examines the accuracy with which the risk variables 
of reported portfolios match up with their actual risk. We use the standard deviation of 
annualised inter-day returns and DGTW characteristic-adjusted alphas to measure 
volatility and idiosyncratic risk. We do not find statistically significant differences 
between inferred and actual values of either measure of risk; this result is robust for 
volatility only when funds are divided by performance (Table 3, Panel B). Periodic 
reporting does significantly underestimate idiosyncratic volatility in top-quartile managers 
across all reporting frequencies (Table 3, Panel C), and this difference is substantially 
greater for longer inter-reporting periods. This suggests that top-quartile funds take large 
active bets in the interim period to drive performance. 
Our results suggest that a periodic reporting system understates excess 
performance for top quartile performing managers, as well as their exposure to inter-day 
idiosyncratic volatility. Furthermore, the degree of under-reporting for both increases as 
the inter-reporting period lengthens. This may be an issue for performance-chasing 
prospective clients, as it makes top-performing funds (ex-post) difficult to identify, while 
at the same time masking the idiosyncratic risks that they take on to achieve higher alpha. 
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4.2. Copycat Funds 
The second part of this study addresses concerns around third parties exploiting the 
information released by fund managers for their own investment purposes. Specifically, 
we examine the profitability of a deterministic strategy where an otherwise uninformed 
investor buys and holds the disclosed portfolio positions of fund managers. This contrasts 
with front-running methods of exploitation, where savvy investors anticipate the net 
direction of future trades based on a fund manager’s disclosed holdings (e.g. if a fund 
manager is steadily accumulating a position or needs to sell tax loss holdings at the end of 
a financial year) and enters the market ahead of the fund manager themselves.  
The method we use follows Verbeek and Wang (2013).  Using reported portfolios 
taken at varying intervals (monthly, quarterly, semi-annual and annually), we construct 
copycat funds which lag the snapshot date by a further one, three, six or twelve months. 
This reflects variations in possible ‘grace periods’ given to fund managers to lodge their 
portfolio holdings, similar to the 60-day grace period given to US mutual funds to submit 
their Section 13F filings. The copycat fund then employs a buy-and-hold strategy on the 
emulated portfolio until the next holdings snapshot is revealed. For the purpose of this 
study, we assume that transaction costs for the copycat fund are not significantly different 
from those of the underlying fund.  
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We find a large dispersion of copycat fund outcomes relative to their underlying 
funds, however the mean difference in performance is not significantly different from zero 
across most reporting frequencies and lag periods (Table 4). The bias of the dispersion 
appears to be related to the performance of the underlying fund managers. To demonstrate 
this, we partition each fund into quartiles based on their mean DGTW characteristics-
adjusted excess returns over the observation period. The hindsight bias introduced by this 
method effectively allows copycats perfect foresight with regard to fund performance 
rankings, and hence allows us to determine the effectiveness of copycat funds in the worst 
case scenario. A number of trends are immediately obvious in the results (Table 5): (a) 
copying a top/(bottom)-quartile fund based on their periodic disclosure tends to result in 
significant underperformance (outperformance); (b) lower reporting frequency amplifies 
the difference between copycat and underlying funds; and (c) longer lags enhance the 
effectiveness of copying top- and bottom-quartile funds.  
Trend (a) suggests that top-quartile performing fund managers exploit short-term 
information advantages and produce significant excess returns through active trading. 
Copycat funds following superior managers are not able to capitalise on these time-
sensitive portfolio changes, and hence are not able to match the underlying fund’s 
performance even when the copycat can identify (and indeed, forecast) which funds will 
be top-performing. Conversely, bottom-quartile fund managers appear to be selling 
17 	  
holdings that subsequently outperform those that they buy. Because the copycat fund 
delays such trades, we observe relatively better performance in the copycats.  
Trend (b) demonstrates that lower reporting frequencies exaggerate the difference 
between copycat funds and the underlying funds. Top-quartile performing funds 
outperform their copycats by even greater degrees when the mandated disclosure 
frequency is lower (e.g. every 6 or 12 months). This is applicable for all lags except the 
12-month lag, where the underperformance of the copycat funds is economically 
significant but not statistically significant. Conversely, bottom-quartile funds are 
outperformed by their copycat funds to an even greater degree when the reporting 
frequency is decreased. This may be because, unlike the underlying funds, the copycat 
funds avoid non-profitable rebalancing during the intra-reporting period.  
Trend (c) indicates that longer lags actually enhance the performance of copycat 
funds following first and fourth quartile funds. For copycat funds following first quartile 
managers, lagging the disclosed holdings by longer periods reduces the relative 
underperformance of the copycat. This may reflect the observation made by Chen et al. 
(2014) that the initial performance advantage of purchased stocks over sold stocks tends to 
revert over the medium and long term. At a 12-month lag, we find that the difference 
between copycat funds and underlying top-quartile funds are not statistically significant. 
On the other hand, copycat funds following bottom-quartile managers outperform their 
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underlying funds even more significantly (both statistically and economically) when 
following at longer lags. This suggests that stocks sold by bottom-quartile funds continue 
to outperform those that they buy over the longer term, up to at least a year out from their 
respective transaction dates. We find that at the most frequent reporting period (monthly), 
top-quartile funds still outperform their copycat funds by 0.97% annualised (or 0.64% at a 
12 month lag), which more than covers the typical range of institutional management 
fees7. Furthermore, longer lags between reporting increase the advantage of top-quartile 
funds over copycats. Instituting longer lags between the holdings snapshot date and the 
public disclosure date does not appear to help protect fund managers’ IP. Longer lags 
actually reduce the performance disadvantage associated with copying a top-tier fund, and 
increase the outperformance achieved when copying a bottom-tier fund.  
5. Conclusion 
Our study examines the potential impact of introducing mandatory portfolio 
holdings disclosure with respect to a market that currently has no mandated holdings 
disclosure regime. For Australia, by introducing a regulatory reporting regime informed by 
robust academic research, the potential outcomes could lead to the market reaping the 
benefits of a more efficient and effective funds management industry. Our findings 
suggest that high frequency disclosure of portfolio holdings increases the accuracy with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Typically 0.3% to 0.7% of funds under management 
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which reported holdings reflect the true performance of the underlying funds, without 
significantly impeding the competitiveness of funds that are most likely to be copied (i.e. 
top-quartile funds). We recognise that front-running of funds’ transactions will still be a 
concern, however this requires a measure of skill in execution and is difficult to explicitly 
test ex-ante.  
Disclosing portfolio holdings at monthly intervals results in inferred excess returns 
and volatilities that are significantly closer to those derived from daily holdings, 
particularly for top-quartile funds, where most investor interest is likely to be 
concentrated. We show that reporting at longer intervals significantly underestimates both 
the excess performance and volatility of top-tier funds, which may lead investors to 
undervalue these funds and underestimate the risks associated with these funds. 
The results show that the perceived threat from copycat funds should not be a 
significant concern to top-tier funds because, at all reporting frequencies, these funds 
generate sufficient outperformance over the copycats to cover typical management fees. 
On the other hand, copycat funds may provide additional incentive for poor-performing 
managers to lift their performance, by improving their investment decisions and/or 
lowering their fees. The effectiveness of copycat funds does not appear to be degraded by 
increasing the lag between the snapshot date and the public disclosure date (within the 
range of 1 month to 1 year). From an investment client’s perspective, more frequent 
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disclosure incentivises improvements in trading performance while simultaneously 
providing a barrier to inflated management fees.  
The Commonwealth Treasury undertook a review in 2013-14 (not yet finalised) 
titled 'Better regulation and governance, enhanced transparency and improved 
competition in superannuation' 8  which called for submissions in part on disclosure 
systems that could operate in the Australian superannuation industry.  A natural extension 
to our study would be to examine the recommended system to be adopted, and the efficacy 
of this framework, once the Assistant Treasurer releases the final policy framework 
sometime in 2015. 
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Figure 1: Comparison of annual returns between the Mercer Portfolio Analytics (MPA) 
database and our proprietary data set. The MPA database consists of a total of 256 active 
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Table 1: Panel A displays the characteristics of our data set grouped by year. This data 
was collected from fund managers on a voluntary basis throughout the 1996 to 2010 
period. Panel B presents the trade characteristics of the database based on size, book-to-
market ratio and prior year return. The information in this panel was synthesized with 
returns data sourced from the SIRCA Australian Equities Tick History database, market 
capitalization and dividend data from the SPPR database and financial statement data from 




 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
No. of Managers 13 15 20 25 31 
Buys 1956 2969 4436 6547 10795 









Sells 1526 2084 2865 5671 7736 




















      
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
No. of Managers 33 22 8 10 20 
Buys 11697 2009 1863 2598 5777 









Sells 10193 1664 2048 1947 4789 




















      
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
No. of Managers 19 20 25 26 24 
Buys 6884 7408 10873 11370 9094 











Sells 6072 7258 10691 12427 8160 










































1 - 50 
73.64
% 1 (Low B/M) 27.64% 1 (Lowest) 3.49% 
51 - 100 
16.44
% 2 34.83% 2 16.88% 
101 - 
200 7.80% 3 23.96% 3 30.28% 
201 - 
300 1.62% 4 9.17% 4 27.43% 
300 +  0.49% 5 (High B/M) 4.40% 5 (Highest) 21.93% 
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Table 2: Comparison of DGTW fund alphas derived from reported holdings at different 
disclosure frequencies versus actual underlying fund alphas (Panel A), and when 
partitioned into quartiles by fund alpha (Panel B). Each quartile contains approximately 15 
funds in Panel B. Percentages represent annualised DGTW characteristics-based excess 
returns (see main text for construction method and rationale). Actual fund alphas vary due 
to differences in included data for the different reporting intervals (see main text for 
details). Results are based on trades and holdings data described in the Data section, as 
well as daily price level and dilutions data from the SIRCA Australian Equities Tick 
History database, market capitalization and dividend data from the Share Price and Price 












Monthly 2.00% 2.18% -0.17%*** 
Quarterly 2.08% 2.26% -0.18%*** 
Semi-annual 1.80% 1.96% -0.16%* 
Yearly 1.48% 1.82% -0.34%** 
*** <1% significance, ** <5% significance, * <10% significance 
 
Panel B 
 Monthly Quarterly 
Semi-
annual Yearly 
Quartile 1 - best -0.46%*** -1.00%*** -0.76%*** 
-
1.14%*** 
Quartile 2 -0.22%** -0.13% -0.25% -0.75%** 
Quartile 3 -0.05% 0.05% 0.01% 0.09% 
Quartile 4 - worst -0.04% 0.03% 0.23% 0.48% 
*** <1% significance, ** <5% significance, * <10% significance 
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Table 3: Errors between volatility (standard deviation of inter-day returns) and 
idiosyncratic volatility (standard deviation of inter-day DGTW alpha) measured from 
periodically disclosed holdings snapshots, and those of the true portfolio (Panel A). 
Results have also been partitioned into quartiles of approximately 15 funds by underlying 
fund alpha for volatility (Panel B) and idiosyncratic volatility (Panel C). Underlying daily 
returns were annualised to produce annualised volatility measurements, and consequently 
annualised differences in volatility. Negative errors denote the reported portfolios 
exhibiting lower volatility and idiosyncratic volatility than the true portfolios. Results are 
based on trades and holdings data described in the Data section, as well as daily price level 
and dilutions data from the SIRCA Australian Equities Tick History database, market 
capitalization and dividend data from the Share Price and Price Relative database and 








Month 0.05% 0.01% 
Quarter -0.06% -0.03% 
Semi-
annual 0.08% -0.18% 
Year 0.56% -0.26% 
*** <1% significance, ** <5% significance, * <10% significance 
 
Panel B 
 Monthly Quarterly Semi-annual Yearly 
Quartile 1 - best -0.21% -0.15% -0.12% 0.51% 
Quartile 2 0.06% -0.05% -0.20% 1.01% 
Quartile 3 0.33% 0.39% 0.49% -0.23% 
Quartile 4 - worst -0.02% -0.35% 0.13% 0.97% 
*** <1% significance, ** <5% significance, * <10% significance 
 
Panel C 
 Monthly Quarterly Semi-annual Yearly 
Quartile 1 - best -0.44%*** -0.94%** -1.52%** 
-
2.84%** 
Quartile 2 -0.03% 0.24% -0.41% 0.94% 
Quartile 3 0.40% 0.31% -0.11% 0.86% 
Quartile 4 - worst 0.03% 0.13% 0.19% -0.69% 
*** <1% significance, ** <5% significance, * <10% significance 
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Table 4: Differences in DGTW alphas between copycat funds and the underlying funds 
across four different reporting periods and 4 different lags. Results are based on trades and 
holdings data described in the Data section, as well as daily price level and dilutions data 
from the SIRCA Australian Equities Tick History database, market capitalization and 
dividend data from the Share Price and Price Relative database and financial statement 
data from the Aspect Huntley database. 
 
 Reporting Period (Months) 




1 -0.12% -0.14% -0.12% -0.36%** 
3 0.04% -0.11% -0.11% -0.18% 
6 -0.04% -0.10% -0.02% 0.35% 
12 0.32% 0.27% 0.34% 0.41% 
*** <1% significance, ** <5% significance, * <10% significance 
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Table 5: Differences in DGTW alphas between copycat funds and the underlying funds 
across four different reporting periods and 4 different lags (Panel A). Results have been 
partitioned into quartiles by underlying fund performance (as measured by mean alpha 
actually generated) with the first quartile being the best performing fund managers and the 
fourth quartile being the worst. Each quartile contains approximately 15 funds (Panel B). 
Results are based on the same data as that described in the previous table. 
 
Panel A 
 Reporting Period (Months) 




1 -0.12% -0.14% -0.12% -0.36%** 
3 0.04% -0.11% -0.11% -0.18% 
6 -0.04% -0.10% -0.02% 0.35% 
12 0.32% 0.27% 0.34% 0.41% 





First Quartile Reporting Period (Months) 


















* -1.53%*** -1.61%*** 
12 -0.64% -0.77% -0.79% -0.84% 
      
Second Quartile Reporting Period (Months) 




1 -0.15% -0.08% -0.40%* -0.83%** 
3 -0.13% -0.35% -0.30% 0.03% 
6 -0.55% -0.86%** -0.48% 0.32% 
12 -0.49% -0.28% -0.06% -0.47% 
      
Third Quartile Reporting Period (Months) 




1 0.24% 0.02% 0.16% 0.21% 
3 0.37% 0.39% -0.01% -0.27% 
6 0.29% 0.46% 0.52% 0.54% 
12 0.59%* 0.30% 0.21% 0.62% 
      
Fourth Quartile Reporting Period (Months) 




1 0.15% 0.33% 0.76% 0.85%*** 










* 2.00%** 2.26%** 
*** <1% significance, ** <5% significance, * <10% significance 
